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Abstract
This paper explores how Turkey’s politics and economy are affected by changes in
global energy. To define which are the most relevant developments, the paper opens
with an overview of the country's economic landscape. This analysis illustrates that
energy, being the key driver behind its large current account deficit, represents a major
point of vulnerability for the country. On this basis, the paper illustrates Turkey's energy
matrix, an analysis that outlines the rising role of gas in the country's energy sector,
both under the internal (i.e. growing share of the mix) and external (i.e. the country's
potential role as regional gas hub) points of view. Finally, these issues are discussed
with the aim of assessing the prospects for Turkey to turn gas into a geopolitical and
economic asset for the country.
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Introduction
This paper seeks to explore how Turkey’s politics and economy are affected by changes
in global energy.
To define which are the most relevant developments, the paper opens with an overview
of the country's economic landscape. This analysis illustrates that energy, being the key
driver behind its large current account deficit, represents a major point of vulnerability
for the country.
On this basis, the paper illustrates Turkey's energy matrix, an analysis that outlines the
rising role of gas in the country's energy sector, both under the internal (i.e. growing
share of the mix) and external (i.e. the country's potential role as regional gas hub)
points of view.
Finally, these issues are discussed with the aim of assessing the prospects for Turkey
to turn gas into a geopolitical and economic asset for the country.
Turkey's economic and geopolitical landscape: energy as key Achilles' heel?
Economically speaking, Turkey entered the new millennium in a very bumpy way. A
major financial and economic crisis hit the country in 2000/2001, forcing the
government to adopt a series of structural reforms to relief the situation and put the
country back on track of growth and prosperityi. These reforms, successfully designed
by then-Minister of the Economy Kemal Dervis ii , paved the way for the strong
economic growth staged by Turkey in the following years.
The country's GDP climbed from a level of USD 267 billion in 2000 to a level of USD
798 billion in 2014 (Fig. 1). According to IMF estimates iii , Turkey's GDP will
considerably grow up to 2020, recovering from the current slowdown. The economic
growth of the last decade was also accompanied by a consistent population expansion.
In fact, always as shown in Fig. 1, the country's population augmented from a level of
64 million in 2000 to a level of 76 million in 2014 - a trend also likely to continue in
the future.

Figure 1
Evolution of Turkey's GDP and population (2000-2020)

Source: own elaboration on IMF World Economic Outlook Database,
accessed in November 2016.

As a result of this economic growth and population expansion, energy consumption
increased significantly. Energy demand in the country skyrocketed from 74 Mtoe in
2000 to 125 Mtoe in 2014iv. In particular, electricity demand climbed steeply from 124
TWh in 2000 to 250 TWh in 2014. To make these numbers more eloquent, it might be
noted that Turkey's energy demand expanded by an average annual growth rate of 4%
between 2000 and 2014, while the EU energy demand basically stagnated. Similarly,
between 2000 and 2014 electricity demand grew by an average annual rate of 5%, while
in the EU it -again- essentially stagnated (Fig. 2).

Figure 2
Growth rates of energy and electricity demand in Turkey and the EU (2000-14)

Source: own elaboration on BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2016).

This rapid growth in energy demand had a consistent impact on the macroeconomic
situation of the country. Apart from coal, a resource largely available in the country,
Turkey is not a fossil fuel-rich country and has to import almost all the oil and gas it
consumes. Considering that, as it will be illustrated in detail hereafter, over the 2000s
much of the new energy demand has been covered by gas, the overall energy bill of the
country has strongly increased. As a result, Turkey's current account deficit has
significantly widened between 2000 and 2014, expanding from 3.7% of GDP in 2000
to 5.5% of GDP in 2014 - also by experiencing very high peak levels such as the 10%
of GDP in 2011 (Fig. 3)v.
Figure 3
Evolution of Turkey's current account balance (2000-2020)

Source: own elaboration on IMF World Economic Outlook Database,
accessed in November 2016.

This substantial current account deficit represents a major element of vulnerability for
Turkey. In particular, it exposes the country to international financial market storms, in
a time of progressive tightening of the US monetary policyvi. Not by coincidence, since
the US Federal Reserve has started to taper its quantitative easing programme, the
Turkish lira has been among the most devaluated currencies in emerging marketsvii.
Via the current account deficit, energy thus constitutes a major burden for the Turkish
economy. This situation has improved during the last two years, after the historical fall
in oil prices commenced in June 2014. In fact, between 2013 and 2015 the country's
current account deficit was basically reduced by half. However, this positive trend
might quickly reverse in the moment that oil prices will eventually start to recover.
The fall in oil prices has therefore a profound effect on Turkey. It provides a precious
window of opportunity for the country to scale-up its economic competitiveness,
particularly in a time of economic slowdown. However, this favourable situation will
not last forever, and can thus not be considered as structural. The analysis of Turkey's
energy matrix provides further insights.
Turkey's energy matrix: the rising role of gas
When looking at the historical evolution of Turkey's energy mix, the first element to
catch the attention is certainly the steep rise staged by gas during the 2000s (Fig. 4).
Figure 4
Turkey's energy mix: historical evolution and 2014 breakdown
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With demand growing rapidly, from 6 Bcm in 2000 to 32 Bcm in 2014, gas has indeed
established itself as the fuel of choice in industrial, residential and power generation
sectors. This for two main factors: i) Environment: nothing related to climate change

mitigation, but more simply to rising concerns about air pollution in big cities due to
coal fired power plants; ii) Economic efficiency: gas was soon considered an attractive
solution for power generation due to short construction period of plants and high
thermal efficiencies.
Having no resources at home, Turkey has to import gas from producing countries in the
region, in particular Russia and Iran (Fig. 5).
Figure 5
Turkey's gas import portfolio (2014)
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Source: own elaboration on BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2016).

Considering this dependency on few external gas suppliers, Turkey has placed security
of gas supply at the top of its energy policy priorities. In fact, due to its complex
infrastructure characteristics, gas is of course perceived by Turkey as a much more
geopolitical fuel than oil (that has a very flexible global market) and coal (that is largely
available domestically).
However, Turkey also sees gas as a potential opportunity, particularly on the basis of
its strategic geographical location at the crossroads of Caspian, Middle Eastern and
Eastern Mediterranean gas-rich countries and Europe. In particular, this is not only seen
as a way for Turkey to diversify its own gas supply portfolio, but also to become a
regional gas hub. For the stake of clarity, it should be here outlined that in the Turkish
energy debate there is no specific meaning for the term 'hub'. In other words, some
analysts use 'hub', while others use 'transit platform' or 'energy corridor'. The basic
concept standing behind all those different expressions is the one of having a series of
international pipelines crossing the country, in order to get transit revenues but also
more geopolitical relevance.
This opportunity concerning gas particularly emerged after the launch of the Southern
Gas Corridor (SGC) initiative by the EU in 2008. After the 2006 Russia-UkraineEurope gas crisis, the EU made the SGC a key component of the EU energy security

strategy for two key reasons: i) Reducing the perceived over-dependence on Russian
gas supplies by allowing new supplies from the Caspian and Middle Eastern regions to
reach Europe; ii) Creating more competition on Southern and Eastern European gas
marketsviii.
The evolution of the SGC from Nabucco to TANAP: what's in for Turkey?
Turkey strongly supported the SGC initiative, also by giving all its political support to
Nabucco, the proposed 3,800 km pipeline with a capacity of 31 bcm/y, intended to carry
gas from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iraq and Iran to south-east and central Europe via
Turkeyix.
Strong of the political backing given by the EU, Turkey and the USx, the Nabucco
project gradually advanced from the signing in 2005 of the joint venture agreement
between the five companies initially involved, to the signing in 2011 of the project
support agreements between the Nabucco consortium and each of the five transit
countries (Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey)xi.
However, notwithstanding the strong commitment of the five transit countries and the
unprecedented support of the EU and the US, the Nabucco project ultimately failed for
a variety of commercial and financial reasons, such as weak outlook for EU gas
demand, uncertain deliverability of supplies, potential competition from the Russian
South Stream pipeline that was supposed to bring gas from Russia through the Black
Sea to Bulgaria, and lack of guarantees or long-term ship-or-pay contracts that would
facilitate access to bank loansxii.
The difficulties encountered by the Nabucco project paved the way for the emergence
of a new version of the SGC, promoted by the only available regional supplier:
Azerbaijanxiii. In 2011 Azerbaijan signed a memorandum of understanding with Turkey
on the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), a project very different to Nabucco in terms
of initial capacity (16 bcm/y) and especially in terms of legal structure. Nabucco, being
a project completely under EU law, was subject to rules such as third-party access and
unbundling throughout its entire lengthxiv. By contrast, considering that Turkey has not
yet adopted the EU energy acquis in its legislation, Azerbaijan – with a major stake in
the TANAP project – will in practice control the pipeline and all gas transit through it.
Considering both Turkey’s reluctance to enter the Energy Community xv and the
difficulties related to the opening of the energy paper of Turkey’s EU accession process,
this situation is also unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

Figure 6
The Southern Gas Corridor: gas reserves and pipeline projects

Source: own elaboration (2016).

The construction of TANAP (Fig. 6) started in 2015 and the pipeline is expected to
become operational in 2018. This development can be certainly pointed out as a very
relevant development for Turkey. In fact, TANAP will not only provide the country
with additional volumes of gas useful to reduce the share of other major suppliers, but
it will also allow first gas transit through the country to Europe.
However, it is difficult to read this development as a major geopolitical gain for Turkey.
In fact, the 10 bcm/y transiting to Europe will represent a limited share of Europe's
import requirements. In addition to this, the previously illustrated legal structure of
TANAP will not provide to Turkey any particular geopolitical leverage.
Also, considering the unlikely scale-up of the SGC in the foreseeable future, due to a
mix of economic and geopolitical constrains in regional producing countriesxvi , the
margin of manoeuvre of Turkey in the regional gas markets thus seems to be rather
limited.
As a result, in the foreseeable future, the country will unlikely be able to make a
consistent step forward towards the realization of its regional gas hub ambitions.

The evolution of the SGC: what impact on the EU-Turkey relations?
Over the last two decades, energy has emerged as an increasingly important component
of the overall cooperation scheme being built between the EU and Turkey. In particular,
over the years the EU-Turkey energy relations have progressively focused on gas,
mainly because of the high expectations about Turkey’s role as key regional gas hub
between European markets and Caspian and Middle Eastern new supplies.
The developments of the SGC just described then also call into question the EU-Turkey
energy relations. In particular, a major question is whether the SGC might have evolved
from being a pivotal element of the EU-Turkey energy relations to becoming their
Achilles’ hell. In fact, the odyssey of Nabucco and the emergence of TANAP have
ultimately outlined a progressive divergence in the way the EU and Turkey perceived
not only the SGC but also their energy relations. As previously mentioned, after years
of cooperation with the EU on Nabucco, in 2011 Turkey rapidly decided to change its
approach and turn to Azerbaijan to speed-up the development of the SGC. This choice
clearly reflected the fact that the primary aim of Turkey is to realize its own energy
security, but it also reflected a genuine discontent of Turkey towards the EU due to the
continuous procrastination of the accession negotiations in general and to the vagueness
of the EU about the opening of the accession process’s energy chapter in particular.
This divergence represents a serious risk not only for the EU-Turkey energy relations,
but also for the strategic interests of the two players individually. A coherent and
coordinated approach on the SGC would indeed allow the two players to pursue their
respective interests in a much more effective way. First of all, by dealing together with
natural gas producing countries the EU and Turkey could well enhance their bargaining
power. Secondly, a coherent approach on the infrastructural development could allow
the overcoming of a number of political and commercial barriers, respectively through
the enhancement of their political and diplomatic leverage and the achievement of
economies of scalexvii.
The troubled evolution of TurkStream
On 1 December 2014, Russian president Vladimir Putin surprised the energy world by
announcing, during a state visit to Turkey, the demise of South Stream and the launch
of a new project to supply Turkish and south-eastern European markets from 2019
while completely bypassing Ukraine: TurkStream xviii . This proposal represented
another relevant development of regional energy for Turkey.

After this declaration, Gazprom specified that Russia's plan was to construct a new
pipeline under the Black Sea to Turkey with the same capacity of South Stream (63
Bcm/y), to supply 14 Bcm/y to Turkey and the rest to be used for a gas hub on the
border with Greece. He also declared that primary aim of the pipeline was to completely
eliminate Ukraine from Russia's gas transit to Europe. The pipeline was set to start at
the Russkaya pumping station on the Russian coast of the Black Sea, which was
supposed to be also the starting point of South Stream. Miller also said that an
agreement on the pipeline was previously reached with Turkey and the sides already
signed a memorandum of understanding xix . TurkStream, as it would have been
successively named, was then already taking shape. After two months of discussions
between Russia and Turkey, the latest route of TurkStream was presented in February
2015 (Fig. 7).
Figure 7
TurkStream

Source: own elaboration (2016).

The pipeline is supposed to run for 660 km from the Russkaya pumping station on the
Russian coast of the Black Sea along the old route of South Stream up to the Bulgarian
exclusive economic zone, after which a new 250 km route would have dip southwest
and run through the Turkish zone to the Turkish coast, near the village of Kiyikoy.
According to Gazprom, the gas delivery point for Turkish consumers would be set in

Luleburgaz, while a connection between Turkey and Greece would be planned in
Ipsala. After the 910 km in the offshore Black Sea, the pipeline would thus run for
additional 180 km on the onshore Turkish territoryxx. Gazprom declared, always in
February 2015, its intention to advance the construction of the pipeline’s initial strings
(with a capacity of 14 Bcm/y, which correspond to the volume of gas that Turkey
currently imports from Russia through Ukraine) by December 2016xxi.
According to this plan, it would be up to European transmission system operators to
construct the infrastructure needed to connect the TurkStream delivery point at the
Turkish-Greek border with destination markets in Central-western Europe.
Considering the geopolitical impasse between the EU and Russia, this perspective
envisaged in February 2015 did, of course, not advanced.
Furthermore, the evolution of the Russia-Turkey relations did not help the development
of TurkStream neither. In fact, the project was slowed-down due to Turkey’s internal
political instability in view of the general elections of June 2015. When these elections
resulted in a hung parliament and coalition negotiations broke down, Turkish President
Erdoğan called for snap elections in November 2015, thus further prolonging the
political vacuum in the country.
In addition to this, an unprecedented political standoff between Russia and Turkey
arisen after the dawning of the Russian aircraft by the Turkish Air Force near the SyriaTurkey border, on 24 November 2015. This event was also seen, at time, as the final
point to the TurkStream project.
However, in a surprising twist, the geopolitical landscape of the region changed again
when, on June 30, 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that Turkey had
apologized for the shooting down of the Russian fighter jet with a letter sent by Turkish
President Erdoğan on June 23xxii.
Since then, strained relations between the two countries entered a reconciliation
process, that also re-opened the discussions about TurkStream. This Russia-Turkey
rapprochement was not driven by the energy issue, but rather by the pressure put on
Turkey by the terrorist attacks of Kurdish guerrillas and of Daesh, by the massive influx
of Syrian refugees into the country and by the mounting economic problems
compounded by Russian sanctions.
This rapprochement certainly created, as a side-effect, also the conditions for a
reinvigorated partnership in energy. Along this line, on August 31 Russia and Turkey

reached an agreement on the earliest possible completion of the procedure for issuing
authorizations required to launch the TurkStream project.
On September 30, Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak declared his optimism
about the quick advancement of all required construction and survey permits for
Turkish territorial waters, on the basis of which the construction of the first line of
TurkStream might eventually start.
On October 10, the agreement on the TurkStream project between the government of
Russia and Turkey was finally signed in Istanbul. This document provides for the
construction of two strings of the gas pipeline, as well as an onshore string for gas
transit to Turkey’s border with neighboring countries.
The troubled evolution of TurkStream illustrates how unpredictable the development
of big energy infrastructure projects could be. It also shows how energy projects are
function of the overall geopolitical dynamics, and not vice-versa.
It is thus possible to state that in order to understand the future prospects of TurkStream,
the overall Russia-Turkey relations will need to be closely followed – as they do
represent they key driver behind any of these evolutions.
Conclusions
This paper illustrated that three are the key recent developments in global and regional
energy that have been the most relevant for Turkey: the fall in oil prices started in 2014,
the construction of the TANAP gas pipeline started in 2015 and the troubled evolution
of the TurkStream gas project.
Low oil prices clearly represent a godsend for both Turkish consumers and public
finances. This exogenous boost to the economy also has a political spillover, as it
provides to the government a great facilitation on its attempt to revive a sluggish
economy.
The construction of TANAP represents an important investment in the country, and
provides to the government an additional tool not only in the negotiations of energy
contracts with other suppliers, but also in the internal political narrative of expanding
geopolitical influence.
However, the effects of these two developments might be short-lived. Sooner or later
oil prices will rise again, and in that moment the challenges of the past will represent
in Turkey, with both economic and political consequences. In parallel, the TANAP
pipeline will not result in a major geopolitical gain for the country, and the difficulty of

scaling it up in the longer term could eventually derail Turkey's regional gas hub
ambitions.
The evolution of the TurkStream pipeline project still represents a major element of
uncertainty in the region. In fact, after being dismissed in the aftermath of the
unprecedented political standoff emerged between Turkey and Russia in 2015, the
project is currently being discussed again, as the two countries continue their
rapprochement. Considering the volatility of regional geopolitics, notably with the
Syrian issue still to be settled, the evolution of this project remains highly uncertain and
it will certainly not be -even in a best case scenario- as quick as initially foreseen.
To conclude, various energy opportunities for Turkey have proved to be short-lived, or
not fully up to expectations, and this situation is unlikely to change in the foreseeable
future, particularly considering the complex regional geopolitics. What will happen in
a longer-term scenario is simply impossible to be projected, as it is impossible to
anticipate what will be the geopolitical evolutions of a region that proved to be
extremely volatile and unpredictable.
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Gas flows from these producing countries would have reached the Turkish border as follow:
via the South Caucasus Pipeline in the case of Azerbaijan; via Iran or the planned TransCaspian Pipeline in the case of Turkmenistan; via the planned extension of the Arab Gas
Pipeline in the case of Iraq.
x
For the EU, Nabucco represented a major opportunity to diversify its natural gas supplies away
from Russia. For Turkey, it represented a unique opportunity to realize its long-term strategic
objective of becoming a key energy hub. For the US, it represented an important geopolitical
asset to reduce the EU natural gas dependency on Russia, exactly as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline served in the 1990s to reduce the EU oil dependency on Russia.
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Not only because of the investments already made on its Shah Deniz natural gas field, but
also because of the need to reach a final investment decision for Shah Deniz Phase II (a decision
that finally arrived on December 17, 2013).
xiv
The intergovernmental agreement signed by the five transit countries in 2009 provided a legal
framework for 50 years, confirming that 50 percent of the pipeline’s capacity was to be reserved
for the shareholders of the project and the remaining 50 percent was to be offered to third-party
shippers on the basis of a regulatory transit regime under EU law.
xv
Turkey says that there are technical problems with some of the Energy Community Treaty’s
provisions. But more fundamentally, it does not like the idea of unilaterally signing up to a big
chunk of the acquis without being able to ask anything in return. Turkey claims that such an
arrangement may suit countries that are not eligible for membership. But Turkey is already a
EU candidate and it does not want to be fobbed off with what it sees as a ‘privileged partnership’
in the energy field.
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European customers after other three legs are built. The timing of this second phase was far
more uncertain than the first one, also considering the need of reviewing or signing new longterm contracts between Gazprom and its European customers (at least the new delivery points
need to be agreed by the Parties) and building pipeline connections across the Balkans to
evacuate the gas from the Turkish-Greek border to the core European gas markets.
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